A lack of reflection and unrealistic strategy

Ten years after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi devastated communities over a wide area, the Japanese government is adhering to an energy policy that seeks to reactivate Japan’s remaining nuclear reactors as if nothing has happened. In the wake of the accident, the government made a show of setting up investigation committees, but ultimately spent less than a year formally establishing the causes of the failure, leaving many questions unanswered. In Goto’s view, the government has failed to learn the key lesson of Fukushima Daiichi - namely that safety should always be the paramount concern, and no set of circumstances with the potential to trigger a serious accident should ever be ignored, however unlikely they seem. He claims Japan’s current approach to many unresolved issues stemming from the accident appears increasingly divorced from reality.

“Risks can be expressed in terms of their ‘potential for damage’ or ‘probability of occurrence.’ If we’re not careful, the danger is that we tend to overlook the potential for serious damage in cases in which a given situation is very unlikely in terms of probability. Of course, there’s no reason why an unlikely situation would only cause limited damage. On the contrary, many unlikely scenarios run the risk of horrendous consequences. Currently, nuclear risk assessment is still too heavily focused on the ‘probability’ aspect.”

In Europe, decommissioning of a nuclear reactor is typically expected to take anywhere between 50 to 70 years. Due to the high levels of residual radioactivity in the early years, some areas have to be left for a substantial length of time before they can be safely dismantled. This approach also shields technicians from excessive exposure to radiation during the decommissioning process. In the case of Fukushima Daiichi, there are still question marks as to whether it is even possible to remove fuel debris* from the reactor vessels safely, and as yet there are no detailed plans for the processing and storage of the debris if and when it is successfully recovered. Units 1 to 3 at Fukushima Daiichi each contain at least 200 to 300 tons of deadly meltdown debris. Poor handling runs the risk of causing further accidents or avoidable exposure. In Goto’s opinion, removal of the debris is not a task to be rushed.

“Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) claims to have a decommissioning schedule that can be completed within the next 30 to 40 years, but this is completely unrealistic. 30 years is the absolute minimum time frame for the planned decommissioning of a plant that hasn’t suffered damage in an accident. Given the severity of what happened and the current state of the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi, in practice we are looking at a process lasting anywhere from 100 to 200 years. But because TEPCO has already claimed that the site can be fully restored, they now feel obliged to come up with a compatible schedule, even though they don’t have a hope. The same goes for dealing with the contaminated water at the Fukushima Daiichi site.”

A question of priorities

When it comes to the decommissioning project planning, as well as the current discussions on the best solutions for dealing with contaminated soil and water, Goto is concerned at the lack of experts prepared to prioritise the lessons of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster. Expertise in the technology should not mean a free rein to decide where to set the limits in terms of safety. Goto says that there is a clear divide between engineers who treat safety as paramount, and those who do not.

“What is the number one priority? If you don’t get that straight and employ experts who understand that safety must be paramount, you are destined to lose sight of that goal. Of course, everyone has their own distinct set of values, and I don’t mean that selection should be purely ideological. But as a minimum, if an engineer doesn’t subscribe to the basic premise that ‘there must be absolutely no danger of releasing harmful radioactive material into the environment’, they have no business being involved in the project.”

What is most important? - it’s the same question that was thrust upon the citizens of Japan ten years ago. Do we prioritise the economy and convenience at any cost, or do we choose to live modestly but in safety and free from worry?

The ‘myth’ of nuclear safety may have been promulgated by the government and power industry – but the public that gladly accepted the myth also bear some responsibility, says Goto. “I can see similarities with how Japan got sucked into World War 2,” he says.

“The country lost its way and the public mood gradually warped, to the point where we were convinced to sacrifice ourselves in war. It’s too complex a process to dismiss with the platitude that the people in charge were wrong and everyone else just got dragged along. I see a similar phenomenon with the nuclear industry, and that’s how the myth of nuclear safety has developed. Whether you are part of the industry or an ordinary citizen, everyone demands ‘safety’, but for that to be meaningful it is important to understand what ‘safety’ really means.”

The right to live in safety

Faced with citizens who demand absolute safety, those promoting the interests of nuclear power have tried to deflect the public’s concerns by introducing the concept of ‘relative safety’, the idea that there is no such thing as absolute safety, yet we accept all manner of slight risks in our daily lives. The technical understanding of ‘safety’ has also been swayed by this reasoning. Only after the Fukushima Daiichi accident did the regulating authorities publicly admit for the first time that nuclear safety ‘is not absolute.’ Even now, the power industry rebuffs demands for total safety as ‘unscientific.’ Goto emphasises that this stance reflects the industry’s unwillingness to address the fundamental safety – in other words, inherent danger – of nuclear technology.

“In the scientific sense, I agree that there is no such thing as ‘absolute’ safety. However, due to the severity and irreparable nature of the damage when something goes wrong at a nuclear plant, I believe that this is technology that should not be used unless an absolute guarantee of safety can be given. In this context, ‘safe’ should mean that there is no potential scenario that cannot be recovered from. The people that design and promote this technology have a responsibility to explain the extent of the demerits to those who might be affected, namely the general public. The nuclear industry is yet to provide the public with a good enough explanation to make an informed decision on whether or not to accept the risks. It’s natural and correct for the public to demand an absolute standard of safety, as they are the one who will suffer when something goes wrong.”

“Safety is a concept that depends on the situation, but individual citizens have the right to expect to be kept safe. It’s an issue of human rights. If we stray from the principle that everyone in society has these rights, the whole society that is built on this principle starts to crumble. I talk about the technology because that’s what I understand best with my background as an engineer, but technology and human rights are interconnected. As far as I am concerned, any technology that oversteps human rights is bad technology.”

If we, the public, do not recognise our rights and engage with information that could have implications for our own safety, we will not have the resources to defend ourselves. Learning the risks associated with the various methods of power generation does not require a technological background, this isn’t a theoretical discussion – we are living in a world that has already seen too many unforgivable accidents.

• *Fuel debris: Nuclear fuel that fuses with the structural elements of the reactor vessel (for example support members, control rods, and the concrete base) in a meltdown.